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THE H'AINT IN THE (SCHOOL) HOUSE: THE INTEREST
CONVERGENCE PARADIGM IN STATE LEGISLATURES AND
SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM
BRYAN L. ADAMSON*
INTRODUCTION
"The people in my area are tired of supporting a 34 percent
graduation rate in Cleveland."
-Rep. Jim Jordan, R-West Liberty, Ohio'
Representative Jim Jordan made this assertion shortly after the
Ohio Supreme Court directed the state legislature to reform the
method by which Ohio's public schools are funded.2 Aside from the
political posturing on display, Jordan's statement seems innocuous
enough. But given Cleveland demographics, viz., over 40% African-
American, 3 and given that city's tortured school desegregation
experience,4 the racial subtext of Jordan's statement is unavoidable.
* Associate Professor of Law, Seattle University School of Law.
1. Lee Leonard, Suburban, Rural Districts Shouldn't Be Penalized, Lawmakers
Say, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Jan. 16, 1997, at 6C.
2. DeRolph v. State (DeRolph 1), 677 N.E.2d 733, 747 (Ohio 1997).
3. Louis Stokes, Governance Plan Shafts the Voters, PLAIN DEALER
(Cleveland), Feb. 3, 1997, at 9B. In 1997, "Cleveland's population [was] 505,616,
with an African-American population of 235,405, for a percentage of 46.6 percent."
Id. Hispanics comprised 6.9% of Cleveland's population in 1997. See Michael 0'
Malley & April McClellan-Copeland, Emerging Voice in Government: Newly
Elected Nelson Cintron Jr. Faces Challenges as the First Hispanic Elected to
Cleveland Council, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Nov. 10, 1997, at lB ("Cleveland's
Hispanic population is estimated at 35,000.").
4. See Reed v. Rhodes, 442 F. Supp. 708 (N.D. Ohio 1976). It was only after
twenty-two years and over eighty orders that Cleveland's Board of Education was
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Jordan's invective, in a more general sense, captures a socio-political
paradigm which has coursed through our nation's battle over school
desegregation and school finance reform, that of "interest
convergence." 5
In the context of public education policy, the paradigm's core
tenet is that any reform solution which benefits African Americans-
whether it be desegregation, busing, or finance adequacy-with no
cognizable benefits for whites will be resisted or rejected outright.
The interest convergence paradigm is illuminated with disquieting
clarity in Professor Derrick Bell's book Silent Covenants.6 Exploring
the arc of civil rights history in the United States, Professor Bell
demonstrates that "the most significant political advances for blacks
resulted from policies which were intended to serve, and had the effect
of serving, the interests and convenience of whites rather than
remedying racial injustices against blacks."7 Time and again-from
the Emancipation Proclamation, to the Civil War Amendments, to the
abolition of slavery in northern states, to Brown v. Board of
Education-Bell offers compelling evidence to conclude that "[b]lack
rights are recognized and protected when and only so long as
policymakers perceive that such advances will further interests that
are their primary concern." 8 Put another way, Bell is saying that the
granted unitary status. Reed v. Rhodes, 1 F. Supp. 2d 705 (N.D. Ohio 1998), affd,
179 F.3d 453 (6th Cir. 1999).
5. See DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION
AND THE UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM 49 (2004).
6. Id.
7. Id. at 56.
8. Id. at 49. For example, Bell and others have examined the Brown v. Board
of Education decisions in the context of the fight against Communism. See id. at 59-
68. As widely acknowledged, the Brown decision was in part a response to
circumstances beyond the schoolhouse: the defeat of Nazism and Communism. Id.
For the United States, segregation "posed a contradiction for the self-proclaimed
exemplar of freedom and democracy." Id. at 60. On the heels of a WWII victory,
and in the throes of a still-existing Communist threat, the Supreme Court-indeed
our entire country-was confronting a shameful moral contradiction: how was it that
we could fight on behalf of others to live free from oppressive regimes while
America continued to confer no rights to African Americans that a "white man was
bound to respect." Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1857). The
importance of moral consistency in the global context was not lost on Presidents
Roosevelt and Eisenhower, or the Supreme Court. That argument proved to be a
powerful weapon in Thurgood Marshall's rhetorical arsenal. Through the Brown
174 [Vol. 43
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victories gained by African Americans never arose out of an absolute
moral imperative of restorative justice; those solutions represented, at
best, results with which whites would also enjoy some tangible
benefit. It is nothing less than disheartening, for those who have
viewed such historic accomplishments as affirmations of white
enlightenment or beneficence, to acknowledge the reality Bell places
before us. .
That sinking feeling, on a level, is the head-spinning realization
that the h'aint 9 -racism-has lurked above or beneath every matter of
unique importance to African Americans. The resulting frustration
could compel a reaction to Representative Jordan's statement similar
to the reaction President Bush received in the aftermath of Hurricane
Katrina-he "doesn't care about black people."' 0  Placing Jordan's
assertion into the reality of interest convergence, however, while
acknowledging the muted specter of racism, offers another
interpretation: for Jordan, school finance reform solutions that bring
no tangible benefits to his suburban (and overwhelmingly white 11)
constituents will never see the light of day. True to the paradigm, the
opinion, political leaders were able to claim a degree of moral superiority relative to
the world community. But for the existence of this larger, nationalistic self-interest,
one wonders whether Brown would have been decided as it was. See Derrick A.
Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93
HARV. L. REV. 518, 524-25 (1980).
9. A "h'aint" is a ghost or spirit. The term is a Southern colloquialism, a
variation of "haunt." URBAN DICTIONARY, http://www.urbandictionary.com/
define.php?term=haint (last visited Sept. 28, 2006).
10. Matea Gold & Scott Collins, NBC Edits Rapper's Comments on Bush:
Kanye West's Remarks During Live Benefit for Hurricane Relief Cut for West Coast
Audience, MORNING CALL (Allentown, Pa.), Sept. 4, 2005, at A5 (quoting Kanye
West's criticism of President Bush during NBC's live telecast of A Concert for
Hurricane Relief on September 2, 2005).
11. Representative Jordan's district, at the time of his statement, included
Logan County. In 1998, Logan County had a population of 45,396, of which 96.3%
were White, 2.3% Black, .5% Hispanic, .8% Asian/Pacific Islander, and .1%
American Indian/Eskimo/Aleut. LOGAN COUNTY DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE 3-4
(2000), http://ohioline.osu.edu/-dataunit/profiles/pdflogad.pdf#search='logan%2.
According to the latest census available, Logan County's racial makeup is 96.5%
White, 1.7% Black, 0.2% American Indian and Alaska Native, 0.5% Asian, 0.0%
Native Hawaiian and Pacific Islander, and 0.8% Hispanic or Latino. U.S. Census
Bureau, State & County QuickFacts, Logan County, Ohio, http://www.
quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/39/3909 .html (last visited Sept. 28, 2006).
2006]
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Ohio legislators have yet to converge on an effective, comprehensive
solution.
While Professor Bell describes some of the recent school funding
litigation and subsequent efforts in his book,' 2 he stops short of
mining those disputes to further illuminate the interest convergence
paradigm. The purpose of this essay is to do so, using the school
finance reform controversy in Ohio as an example. Part I describes
how the school finance reform debate is an extension of our nation's
desegregation history. Part II looks at the school funding controversy
in Ohio, highlighting legislator and citizen attitudes toward school
finance litigation and public school funding along racial and
geographic lines. Part III identifies six interests which emerge in the
school funding dispute, arguing that these interests must be taken into
account by legislators in crafting school finance policy. This essay
concludes by asserting that while some of these interests can be
viewed as race-neutral, our nation's desegregation struggle, and the
racing of school finance reform efforts lurking just beneath, must be
addressed in order to achieve effective solutions to school finance
dilemmas.
I. SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM AS AN EXTENSION OF THE BROWN V.
BOARD OF EDUCATION STRUGGLE
The current school finance reform battle is an extension of the
struggle over desegregation precipitated by the U.S. Supreme Court's
historic Brown v. Board of Education decisions.1 3 During the late
1960s into the late 1970s, white opposition to school integration was
emboldened by political, judicial, and social forces, which conspired
to apply Brown II's "all deliberate speed" directive all too literally. 14
That opposition reached its depths in the fierce resistance to busing.15
12. BELL, supra note 5, at 161-79.
13. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955); Brown v. Bd. of
Educ. (Brown 1), 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see Nathaniel R. Jones, The Judicial Betrayal
of Blacks-Again: The Supreme Court's Destruction of the Hopes Raised by Brown
v. Board of Education, 32 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 109, 128 (2004).
14. See CHARLES J. OGLETREE, JR., ALL DELIBERATE SPEED: REFLECTIONS ON
THE FIRST HALF CENTURY OF BROWN V. BOARD OFEDUCATION 124-34 (2004).
15. See, e.g., CHARLES T. CLOTFELTER, AFTER BROWN: THE RISE AND RETREAT
OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 75 (2004) (discussing Louisville's busing experience);
[Vol. 43
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Riots arising out of busing, other desegregation efforts, and anti-war
and racial strife in the inner-city drove whites to the suburbs in
historic numbers, who then drove their children to suburban and
private schools.' 6 As a result, for those cities under desegregation
orders, achieving the racial balance became impossible, 7 in short,
because there were essentially no whites to integrate.' 8
With white flight came economic flight, and the tax base upon
which urban public schools were financed eroded. At least from the
1960s moving forward, virtually every state relied upon local property
tax values and assessments to finance public kindergarten through
high school (K-12) education.' 9 Inner-city school districts received
disproportionately less money per pupil, as urban districts became
poorer and experienced drops in residential property values and
revenues from businesses.20  Because it was becoming clear that
OGLETREE, supra note 14, at 63-78 (describing the history of and reaction to busing
in Boston).
16. See BELL, supra note 5, at 110; Gary Orfield, Segregated Housing and
School Resegregation, in DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET REVERSAL OF
BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 291, 314-18 (Gary Orfield et al. eds., 1996);
Michael E. Lewyn, Suburban Sprawl: Not Just an Environmental Issue, 84 MARQ.
L. REV. 301, 320 n.159 (2000) (noting that in the first nine months of 1967, there
were 164 race riots throughout the country).
17. See SHERYLL CASHIN, [THE FAILURES OF] INTEGRATION: How RACE AND
CLASS ARE UNDERMINING THE AMERICAN DREAM 206-18 (2004).
18. Robert A. Sedler, Implementing Brown: A Lawyer's View, 50 WAYNE L.
REV. 835, 842-43 (2004).
19. James E. Ryan & Michael Heise, The Political Economy of School Choice,
111 YALE L.J. 2043, 2058 (2002); William E. Thro, A New Approach to State
Constitutional Analysis in School Finance Litigation, 14 J.L. & POL. 525, 525 n.1
(1998) (stating that all states except Hawaii rely upon local property taxes as a
significant part of their school budgets).
20. See Michael E. Lewyn, The Urban Crisis: Made in Washington, 4 J.L. &
POL'Y 513, 520 (1996) (noting how "suburbanization erodes cities' tax bases," and
leaves low-income families in the inner-city); Yale Rabin, Highways as a Barrier to
Equal Access, 407 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. ScI. 63, 69 (1973) (discussing
the impact of suburbanization on inner-city populations and employment, and noting
the consequences of "the departure of commerce, industry, and middle-class
residents to the suburbs may reduce the city's tax revenues"); James E. Ryan, The
Influence of Race in School Finance Reform, 98 MICH. L. REV. 432, 435 (1999)
("Poor students have greater educational needs and require more resources to
educate than do affluent students. Schools dominated by poor students will
therefore usually be more expensive to operate than schools populated by middle-
2006]
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public schools would not achieve the racial balance envisioned by
Brown, school desegregation advocates redirected their efforts toward
ensuring that public school financing would be equal.
School finance reform litigation came in three waves.21 The first
wave arrived in the early 1970s, 22 when desegregation advocates
became increasingly frustrated at the slow pace of improving
conditions for African-American children.23 The second wave came
after San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,24 in
which the Supreme Court held that there was neither a constitutional
right to a public education nor financial equalization between poor and
wealthy school districts. 25  It would take nearly twenty years and
another iteration of school finance litigation to only partly nullify
Rodriguez's impact.26
Within the past ten years, there has been litigation in forty-five
states challenging the funding formulas for public schools. 27  This
recent "third wave" of challenges to school financing inequities has
found some success in the courts.28 As a result, state legislatures have
been forced to address the inherent deficiencies in their school
financing systems. After the Ohio Supreme Court's holding that
reliance upon a property tax-based methodology violates the state
and upper-income students." (footnote omitted)).
21. Michael Heise, State Constitutions, School Finance Litigation, and the
"Third Wave": From Equity to Adequacy, 68 TEMP. L. REv. 1151, 1152 (1995).
22. Id. (citing Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971)).
23. Ryan & Heise, supra note 19, at 2058.
24. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); see Heise,
supra note 21, at 1152.
25. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 36-39, 55.
26. The third wave began in 1989 with two seminal state cases: Rose v.
Council for Better Education, Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989) and Edgewood
Independent School District v. Kirby (Edgewood 1), 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989).
27. Jennifer Carr & Cara Griffith, School Finance Litigation and Property Tax
Reform: Part I, Litigation, ST. TAx NOTES, June 27, 2005, at 1015. Five states-
Delaware, Hawaii, Mississippi, Nevada, and Utah-have not had lawsuits
challenging public school funding schemes. Id. at n. 1.
28. Michael Griffith, School Finance Litigation and Beyond, ECS POLICY
BRIEF, April 2005, http://www.ecs.org/clearinghouse/60/26/6026.htm. Of the
challenges to the adequacy of K-12 spending, plaintiffs have won eighteen of those
cases. Id.
[Vol. 43
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constitution, 29 Ohio is just one of several states currently wrestling
with court-directed mandates.3 °
II. THE WAINT IN THE SCHOOLHOUSE? OHIO
An examination of the Ohio experience reveals that the interest
convergence paradigm lives on in the debate over school finance
reform. Looking at Ohio's demographics, legislature composition,
and proposed remedies leads to the conclusion that only reforms in
which whites-particularly suburban whites-also stand to benefit
will be successful. This is so despite the fact that African-American
children continue to suffer disproportionately from the vestiges of the
state's disparate education systems and policies.3'
In 1997, the Ohio Supreme Court in DeRolph I held that the
state's funding system violated the Ohio Constitution's mandate to
provide "a thorough and efficient system of public schools." 32 The
29. DeRolph 1, 677 N.E.2d 733 (Ohio 1997).
30. See, e.g., Montoy v. State, 120 P.3d 306 (Kan. 2005); Columbia Falls
Elem. Sch. Dist. No. 6 v. State, 109 P.3d 257 (Mont. 2005); Abbott v. Burke, 495
A.2d 376 (N.J. 1985); Neeley v. West Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 176
S.W.3d 746 (Tex. 2005); Edgewoodl, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989).
31. Stephen Ohlemacher, Test Scores Reveal Width of Racial Gap: Long-
Sealed Data Show White Pupils Twice as Likely To Pass 4th-Grade Tests, PLAIN
DEALER (Cleveland), Nov. 4, 2001, at Al. For the 1999-2000 school year, for
example, 29.7% of African-American fourth graders passed Ohio's reading
proficiency test, but 64.3% of whites passed; the gaps were just as wide for
citizenship, math, and science. Id. More recently, in 2005, 47% of African-
American sophomores failed the math portion of the proficiency test, and 65% failed
science. Scott Stephens, New Ohio High School Test Trips Up I in 3 Takers, PLAIN
DEALER (Cleveland), July 14, 2005, at Al.
32. DeRolph I, 677 N.E.2d at 740. The school finance litigation began in 1976
when the Cincinnati Board of Education filed an unsuccessful suit alleging
unconstitutional inequities in school funding. Bd. of Educ. v. Walter, 390 N.E.2d
813 (Ohio 1979). DeRolph, along with five school districts, filed suit in 1991
against the state. DeRolph 1, 677 N.E.2d at 734. The trial court ruled Ohio's
funding formula unconstitutional in 1994, but the Fifth District Court of Appeals
reversed the trial court decision one year later. DeRolph v. State, CA-477, 1995 WL
557316, (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 30, 1995). Appeal was made to the Ohio Supreme
Court by the plaintiffs, which by then included the Ohio Coalition for Equity and
Adequacy of School Funding, a coalition representing over 500 of the state's 611
school districts. See Joe Hallett, T.C. Brown & Mary Beth Lane, Parents and
Educators Agree with High Court Conclusion, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Mar. 25,
2006]
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court directed the Ohio General Assembly to restructure its school
finance methodology to address the inequities between poorer and
wealthier school districts throughout the state.33 To date, there has
been little long-term success.
34
1997, at IA. In 1997, the appellants prevailed. DeRolph 1, 677 N.E.2d at 747. In
May 2000, the supreme court directed the legislature to enact an order that would
bring the public school's funding scheme into constitutional compliance. DeRolph
v. State (DeRolph I1), 728 N.E.2d 993 (Ohio 2000). One year later, the supreme
court relinquished jurisdiction over the case, but gave two stipulations: (1) raise the
minimum per-pupil funding; and (2) within two years, increase the amount of parity
funding to poorer school districts, which were disproportionately overwhelmed with
special education, vocational, and transportation needs. DeRolph v. State (DeRolph
III), 754 N.E.2d 1184, 1200-01 (Ohio 2001). In DeRolph IV, the supreme court
vacated its DeRolph III decision, announcing that DeRolph I and II were the law of
the case. DeRolph v. State (DeRolph IV), 780 N.E.2d 529, 530 (Ohio 2001).
However, the supreme court, once and for all, washed its hands of the litigation, and
held that no court in the state would have further jurisdiction over the matter. State
ex rel. State v. Lewis, 789 N.E.2d 195, 202-03 (Ohio 2003) (granting the State's
application for writ of prohibition against original trial court judge ordering any new
proceedings).
33. DeRolph 1, 677 N.E.2d at 747.
34. It is unclear how the State of Ohio is going to fix its educational finance
problems for the long term.
The Governor of Ohio, Bob Taft, with the legislature, set forth three
programs to address some of the more persistent education-related issues. In 1997,
the legislature established the Ohio School Facilities Commission, charged with
oversight and allocation of school facility improvement initiatives. Editorial, Ohio
Has Made Enormous Strides in Fixing Its Needy Schools, COLUMBUS DISPATCH,
Apr. 8, 2000, at 9A. In 2000, the General Assembly committed $4.5 billion over
twenty-six years to facilities improvements. Id. The volunteer-centered Ohio Reads
program was touted by the Governor to help improve academic achievement
through an expansive tutoring program. Dana DiFilippo, Governor Gives Reading a
Boost, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, June 25, 1999, at IC. The Governor's "Ohio Core"
initiative, which prescribed "a tougher curriculum for high school graduation," was
also proposed. Editorial, Core Mission: Want To Improve Education in Ohio? Get
Serious About Funding, BEACON J. (Akron), Mar. 15, 2006, at B3. This initiative,
however, is still being developed. Sean Strader, Setzer, Smith Race in 36th a Repeat
of 2004 Contest, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Nov. 6, 2006, at A7. In 2005, "[tlhe state
legislature . . . expanded vouchers far beyond Cleveland by allocating money for
14,000 renewable scholarships." Angela Townsend, More Than 2,500 in Ohio
Apply for School Vouchers: Mother of 2 Grateful for State Program, PLAIN DEALER
(Cleveland), July 4, 2006, at B4. Other piecemeal proposals have been attempted.
In March of 2006, state legislators passed a bill that would allow school districts to
increase their revenues without having to place a levy on the ballot every year the
district needs additional funding. See Editorial, The 920 Curse: Ohio Lawmakers
180 [Vol. 43
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Ohio's urban exodus has been stark, with significant population
shifts out of cities and into its suburbs, exurbs, and rural areas.35
Ohio's largest cities, with one exception, have suffered net population
losses, are poorer, and are now significantly or predominantly
African-American.36 Consequently, the political clout of suburban
General Assembly representatives and their constituencies has been
strengthened.37 Since 1994, Republicans have controlled the Ohio
General Assembly 38 and have held every statewide public office.
39
Have Tinkered Again with School Funding, BEACON J. (Akron), Apr. 14, 2006, at
B3. In seeking additional funding sources for public schools, a statewide ballot
measure, Issue 3, would have allowed slot machines at racetracks, with 30% of the
revenue going toward scholarships for college in Ohio. State Referenda Related to
Higher Education, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Wash., D.C.), Oct. 20, 2006, at A32.
That proposal was defeated by a margin of 57% to 43%. Tom Breckenridge,
Middling Support in Cuyahoga Doomed Slot-Machine Proposal, PLAIN DEALER
(Cleveland), Nov. 10, 2006, at B4.
35. According to 2006 estimates, Cleveland's population decreased by 13.4%,
Toledo's by 8.8%, Cincinnati's by 13.2%, Dayton's by 20.2%, and Akron's by
7.8%. Editorial, Our Disappearing Cities, BLADE (Toledo), Aug. 21, 2006; see also
David Knox, Ohio Growth Remains Flat Over 5 Years: Most Areas Lose More
Residents Than They Attract, Census Reports, BEACON J. (Akron), Mar. 16, 2006, at
Al (noting the continuing upward population trends of Ohio suburbs "at the expense
of population losses in most urban areas and many rural counties").
36. According to the 2004 census, while African Americans comprised 11.9%
of Ohio's population, Cleveland is 51% African-American; Youngstown, 43%;
Cincinnati, 43%; Dayton, 43%; Akron, 28%; Columbus, 24%; Toledo, 23%; and
Canton, 21%. U.S. Census Bureau, State & County QuickFacts, Ohio,
http://www.quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/39000.html (last visited Sept. 28,
2006).
37. The Ohio State legislature is comprised of thirty-three Senate and ninety-
nine House members. See The Ohio Senate, Your Senators, http://www.senate.
state.oh.us/senators/by name.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2006); The Ohio House of
Representatives, Your Representatives, http://www.house.state.oh.us/jsps/Searchby
Name.jsp (last visited Sept. 28, 2006).
38. William Hershey, Sherrod Brown Aiming for Senate: House Democrat
Hopes To Challenge De Wine After Facing Paul Hackett in Primary, DAYTON DAILY
NEWS, Nov. 27, 2005, at B1. In February 2003, for example, Republicans
outnumbered Democrats in the House sixty-one to thirty-eight and, in the Senate,
twenty-two to eleven. COUNCIL OF STATE GOv'TS, 35 THE BOOK OF THE STATES
115 (2003). By December 2003, Republicans increased their representation in the
House to sixty-two of the ninety-nine seats and maintained their Senate majority of
twenty-two of the thirty-three seats. COUNCIL OF STATE GOv'TS, 36 THE BOOK OF
THE STATES 84 (2004).
2006]
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That control has enabled Republicans to entrench, particularly
wielding their power in drawing General Assembly district lines, 40 and
to control the agenda for, and solutions to, Ohio's school finance
quandary.
The resistance to school finance reform by some Ohio state
legislators, particularly early on, was baldly hostile. Representative
Jim Jordan made his "34 percent graduation rate" remark days after
the DeRolph I decision was announced. Other suburban Republican
representatives invoked similar reactions. Jim Trakas of the 17th
District, which includes Independence, Ohio (a suburb of Cleveland),
admonished that "[t]aking from Peter to pay Paul is not a sensible
school funding measure." 41 Michael Wise (15th District, Chagrin
Falls), a Republican representing another suburban district, fanned
divisive flames by falsely warning, in a Cleveland newspaper
editorial, that "[n]one of the [monies allocated to equalize financing]
will go toward suburban school districts. 42 In a phrase that harkened
back to reactions to the Brown decisions, he also accused the "judicial
branch [of] usurping the unique constitutional authority of the
legislative branch," and "trash[ing] the concept of separation of
powers." 43
These positions led the Republican-controlled Ohio legislature to
devise a taxation solution to the funding inequities. Two years after
the Ohio Supreme Court's DeRolph I ruling, it was clear that with no
39. See Ohio Secretary of State, Election Results, http://www.sos.state.oh.us/
sos/ElectionsVoter/electionResults.aspx (last visited Nov. 15, 2006) (follow links to
official results for years 1994, 1998, and 2002). Out of the November 7, 2006
election, Democrats gained control of four of five statewide elected executive
offices-the Governor, Attorney General, Secretary of State, and Treasurer. See id.
(follow link for 2006 results).
40. A five-member State Apportionment Board draws legislative districts.
OHIO CONST. art. XI, § 1. The panel is composed of the Governor, State Auditor,
Secretary of State, and two other members (one from each party) chosen by
legislative leaders. Id. Because the Governor, Auditor, and Secretary of State are
all Republicans, see Hershey, supra note 38, the GOP controls the map-making
process.
41. Cindy Kranz, School Funding Options Proposed, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER,
Aug. 14, 2004, at 2B.
42. Michael W. Wise, Editorial, School Funding: Higher Taxes Are Not the
Only Answer, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), July 25, 1997, at 1 lB.
43. 1d.
[Vol. 43
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new taxes, or higher taxes, school finance reform had little chance of
succeeding." Yet, when a taxation solution was finally proposed,
lawmakers sought not only to shift the disproportionate financial
burden to the poorest Ohioans, but also to provide a windfall for their
suburban constituents." In May 1998, the state legislature put Issue 2
on the ballot; Issue 2 would have provided funds for school building
construction by increasing state sales tax by one cent, and also would
have lowered suburban property taxes by 15%.46 Though soundly
defeated,47 the facts were crystal clear: Issue 2 would impose a
regressive tax structure and stood to provide the biggest windfall to
suburban constituents.
The opinions of Ohio citizens revealed a racial and geographic
divide in their opposition to certain school reform measures.
According to a poll conducted in 2001-2002,48 nearly one in four
(23.9%) white respondents felt the Ohio Supreme Court should not be
involved in school funding issues, 49 and 63% said that they would not
donate time or money to a school outside of their district 50  By
comparison, only 7.3% of African-American respondents felt that the
court should not be involved in school funding issues,5 1 and 41% said
44. See Mary Beth Lane, School Fund Reform Plan Would Cost Billions More,
PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Apr. 16, 1997, at 1A (reporting that a proposed school
reform plan in compliance with the guidelines set forth by the Ohio Supreme Court
would cost an extra $4 billion).
45. See Randy Ludlow, Issue 2 Would Tax Poor the Most to Help the Poorest
Schools, CINCINNATI POST, Apr. 13, 1998, at 10A.
46. Mary Beth Lane & Benjamin Marrison, State Issue 2 Crushed: Tax Hike
for Schools Refected by 4-1, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), May 6, 1998, at IA.
47. Id.
48. OHIO'S EDUCATION MATTERS: KNOWLEDGEWORKS FOUNDATION 2001-
2002 POLL (2002), available at http://www.kwfdn.org/poll/2001/pollO2.pdf. The
purpose of the survey was to identify public awareness of and reaction to certain
significant events and attitudes related to school funding and the DeRolph litigation.
Id. at 4. The 2001-2002 poll convened a panel of 505 randomly selected
respondents, and then two months later followed up with phone call surveys of 323
of those respondents. Id. Upon request of this author, the data was recompiled by
KnowledgeWorks Foundation to examine findings based on, inter alia, race and
geography [hereinafter Author's Poll 2001-2002] (on file with author).
49. Author's Poll 2001-2002, supra note 48, at 18.
50. Id. at 6.
51. Id. at 18.
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that they would not donate time or money to another school district.52
On those same questions, there was an urban/suburban split as well,
yet not as dramatic: 20% of urban respondents felt the court should
not be involved in school funding issues, versus 24.3% of suburban
respondents; 53 57.3% of urban respondents would refuse to donate
time or money to other school districts; 56.6% of suburban
respondents felt the same.54
A subsequent poll sought additional information on the
distribution of public education resources.55 Asked whether "it is
necessary to spend more money and resources on poor students or
not," 51.7% of white respondents said "yes," in contrast to 77.8% of
non-white respondents who answered "yes.''56 Asked whether they
would support a local school board-sponsored vote to increase
property taxes in order to increase school funding, 43.2% of white
respondents were somewhat or strongly opposed, in contrast to 25.6%
of non-white respondents.
Several conclusions emerge from this discussion of Ohio's school
finance reform debate: (1) Republican legislators who represent
suburban constituents are most strongly opposed to reform (a) directed
by courts, (b) resulting in tax increases with no perceived benefit to
their constituents, and/or (c) perceived to solely or disproportionately
benefit urban (and largely African-American) constituents; and (2)
there is a substantial black/white and urban/suburban divide amongst
citizens on (a) the role of the courts in remedying the problem of
public school funding, (b) providing more resources to the poor for
education, and (c) taxation as a means of providing more financial
resources to public schools. Tying these conclusions to the interest
convergence paradigm then requires us to explore precisely what
interests are at play.
52. Id. at 6.
53. Id. at 18.
54. Id. at 6.
55. OHIO'S EDUCATION MATTERS: KNOWLEDGEWORKS FOUNDATION 2003-
2004 POLL (2004) (on file with author). These survey results were also recompiled
for the author.
56. Id. at 7.
57. Id.
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III. THE H'AINT IN THE SCHOOLHOUSE? POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS
There are six themes which course through the school finance
reform debate. These themes-collectively, individually, or in some
combination-explain the sentiments about, as well as the processes
and outcomes of legislative responses to, the school finance dilemma.
While they are not necessarily distinct, these themes also reflect
interests which must be acknowledged before any statewide,
legislatively-driven solution can be obtained.
A. Race, Desegregation Efforts, and the Persistence of Memory
Court-ordered desegregation is much less prevalent today.58 Yet
its perceived failures, such as the racially-corrosive busing efforts and
the persistent disparate education outcomes for African-American
students, linger. 9 Interpreting the Ohio KnowledgeWorks Foundation
survey data, it might be postulated that white resistance to school
finance reform directed by courts, which seeks to distribute financial
benefits to minority school districts, can be attributed to a type of
"desegregation fatigue" on the part of white suburbanites. In this
sense, such directives and efforts are viewed with skepticism, seen as
an attempt to extend and force a demonstrably failed social policy. 6°
What prevails out of this skepticism is an attitude that the larger
society no longer bears a moral imperative to remedy the conditions of
public education which have an adverse, disproportionate impact on
African Americans.
58. While the number of active desegregation cases arising out of the Brown v.
Board of Education rulings once exceeded 500, there remain only 284 currently
active cases that the Department of Justice is prosecuting. Telephone Interview with
Franz R. Marshall, Deputy Chief, Educ. Opps. Section, Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep't
of Justice (Nov. 14, 2006).
59. For example, according to the National Assessment of Educational
Progress, in 2003, 60% of black fourth-graders were unable to read at that their
grade level, compared to 25% of whites. George Achibald, 50 Years Later, Brown
Disappoints: Blacks Lag as Schools Resegregate, WASH. TIMES, May 17, 2004, at
Al. In 2004, over 15% of African Americans could not read proficiently upon
leaving high school. Id. Furthermore, only 50.2% of blacks graduate from high
school in four years, versus 74.9% of whites. CHRISTOPHER B. SWANSON, URBAN
INST., PROJECTIONS OF 2003-04 HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES 11, 12 (2004), available
at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411019_2003 04 HSgraduates.pdf.
60. Such a sentiment is also a possible interpretation of Jim Jordan's comment.
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As seen in Ohio, this skepticism is reinforced (or at least, not
disabused) by powerful legislators, themselves doubtlessly aware of
the protracted and contentious litigation that shaped the school
desegregation fight in Cleveland and other major Ohio cities for over
twenty years. 6 1  Even African-American legislators, or others
representing large urban districts, consciously or unconsciously
invoke connections to that history.62 By tethering the school finance
reform debate to a painful past, these legislative actors reinforce in the
collective imagination of their constituents a raced and distorted view
of the primary "instigators" and beneficiaries of school finance
reform.
That view is not simply imposed on constituents; many
constituents have formed that view on their own. In his analysis of
school finance reform controversy in New Jersey, Douglas Reed
found that parents of school children viewed legislative reforms
largely "through racial lenses, 63 regardless of the actual reform scope
and targets. Whites tended "to perceive school finance reform as
primarily benefiting minorities, even when inconsistent with
reality." 64 In Ohio, for example, the facts that the DeRolph litigation
was led by a white plaintiff65 and instituted in a rural, mostly white
county by a coalition of over 500 of Ohio's 611 school districts 66 seem
61. See, e.g., Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979); Dayton
Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 526 (1979); Bell v. Bd. of Educ., Akron Pub.
Sch., 683 F.2d 963 (6th Cir. 1982); Alexander v. Youngstown Bd. of Educ., 675
F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1982); Deal v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 369 F.2d 55 (6th Cir.
1966); Reed v. Rhodes, 442 F. Supp. 708 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
62. State Senator C.J. Prentiss observed that "[w]hile race defined the
boundaries of segregation then, today we face segregation and educational
inequalities that are rooted in economic differences in addition to racial issues."
Scott Stephens & Dave Davis, 66% of Cleveland's Minorities Attend Racially
Isolated Schools, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), May 16, 2004, at Al.
63. Ryan, supra note 20, at 474 (quoting Douglas S. Reed, Twenty-Five Years
After Rodriguez: School Finance Litigation and the Impact of the New Judicial
Federalism, 32 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 175, 212 (1998)).
64. Id. at 475.
65. Catherine Candisky, Political Fix Pitched for School Funding, COLUMBUS
DISPATCH, Sept. 18, 2003, at 5C (displaying a photograph of Nathan DeRolph).
66. See DeRolph I, 677 N.E.2d 733 (Ohio 1997). The suit was instituted in
Perry County, Ohio, id at 734, which in 2000 had a population of just over
34,000-98.5% of whom were white, U.S. Census Bureau, American FactFinder,
Perry County, Ohio, QT-P5. Race Alone or in Combination: 2000,
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to have been lost on many. Thus, it is fair to conclude that raced
perceptions "appear[] to play a 'major role in explaining the level of
[white] support for"' or opposition to reform.67
These raced perceptions also explain, at least in part, the reasons
why some finance reform efforts have been more contentious and
protracted. In his article, The Influence of Race in School Finance
Reform, Professor Jim Ryan compares school finance litigation in
minority and non-minority school districts. 68  Examining thirty-six
state supreme court decisions, and subsequent legislative responses,
Ryan makes three primary findings: (1) urban minority school
districts, acting alone, did not do as well as white districts (i.e.,
majority districts) in school finance reform litigation;69 (2) when
urban minority school districts were successful in courts, "they have
encountered legislative recalcitrance that exceeds, in both intensity
and duration, the legislative resistance that successful white districts
have faced"; 70 and (3) the public-even when confronted with
contrary evidence-invariably viewed legislative reforms in racial
terms.71
Of the thirty-six cases analyzed, eighteen upheld the state school
finance scheme at issue, and eighteen struck down the scheme at
issue.7 2 Of those financing schemes struck down, only one was
brought by a predominately minority urban district,7 3 two were an
http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/QTTable?_bm=y&geo-id=05000US39127&qr_
name=DEC 2000_SFI_UQTP5&-ds name=DEC_2000SFIU (last visited Sept.
28, 2006).
67. Ryan, supra note 20, at 475 (quoting Kent L. Tedin, Self-Interest, Symbolic
Values, and the Financial Equalization of the Public Schools, 56 J. POL. 628, 638
(1994)).
68. Ryan, supra note 20, at 433. Ryan argues for school choice and racial and
socioeconomic integration, using as a basis Kent Tedin's Texas study and Douglas
Reed's New Jersey study of citizen attitudes toward public school finance litigation.
Id. at 432-34. For example, in a survey of "roughly 1,000 whites in two
predominantly white districts near Houston," Texas, 82% assumed the reform would
benefit predominately Hispanic districts, 83% assumed reform would benefit blacks,
and 73% thought whites would lose money. Id. at 473.
69. Id. at 476.
70. Id. at 433.
71. Id. at 458.
72. Id. at451.
73. Id.
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admixture of suburban and rural minorities,74 one was an integrated
urban district, 75 and the rest were suburban/rural white districts.7 6 Of
the unsuccessful challenges, "seven were brought either exclusively
by urban minority districts, or by a small group of plaintiffs that
included at least one urban minority district., 7 7  In short,
predominately minority districts won three out of twelve challenges,
while majority districts won eleven of fifteen.78
B. Political Ideology, Self-Perception, and Race in State Legislatures
The prevailing political ideology and racial composition of state
legislatures also influence efforts toward, and outcomes of, school
finance reform. It is obvious that the political party in control shapes
the legislature's structure, committee assignments, and agenda.
Consequently, the controlling party (especially the one in decisive
control, as the Republicans in Ohio) dictates the ultimate policy
outcomes. However, it is useful to explore some of the more complex
aspects of legislators, the legislative process, and legislative decision
making to more clearly identify how ideology, self-perception, and
race are relevant to school finance reform.
1. Political Ideology
A fundamental principle of representative democracy is that
legislators represent the goals and desires of their district
constituents. 79 Another abiding principle is that legislators may also
seek to realize goals at times independent of constituent interests, and
express their personal ideologies through policy initiatives. 80
74. Id. at 451-52.
75. Id. at 452.
76. Id. at 452-53.
77. Id. at 453.
78. Id. at 455.
79. See Scott Ashworth & Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, Delivering the Goods:
Legislative Particularism in Different Electoral and Institutional Settings, 68 J. POL.
168, 170-71 (2006) (discussing the constituency-serving model of representation).
80. See James B. Johnson & Philip E. Secret, Focus and Style Representational
Roles of Congressional Black and Hispanic Caucus Members, 26 J. BLACK STUD.
245, 251 (1996) (discussing the trustee style of representation).
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Moreover, advocacy groups, coalitions, and networks of all political
or ideological stripes "explicitly seek to exert agenda-setting
influence" upon representatives.
81
In general, these principles guide Democrats and Republicans
equally. However, it is obvious that Republican and Democratic
ideologies view the role of government, separation of powers,
taxation, and education policy in markedly distinct ways. Thus,
ideological affiliation itself provides some insight into legislative
responses to school finance reform. Beyond political ideology
however, legislators and legislative decision making should be more
closely examined by considering self-perceptions of legislative roles.
2. Legislators' Self-Perceptions of Legislative Roles
Role theory posits a set of informal norms of behaviors that
guides actual behavior.82  Generally, legislative roles fall into five
categories: (1) representational, (2) areal, (3) purposive, (4) partisan,
and (5) pressure group. 83 To add insight into school finance reform
debates, it is instructive to focus on the representational and areal
aspects of legislative roles.84
While district constituency and service are important to legislators
across the ideological spectrum,8 5 "[w]ho a representative views as his
or her primary constituency and how a legislator views the job of
81. Neil D. Theobald, Listening, Not Telling: The Need for Issues-Driven
School Funding Reform, N. CENT. REGIONAL EDUC. LABORATORY POL'Y NEWS,
Oct. 2000, at 1.
82. Johnson & Secret, supra note 80, at 248. "Legislative role is conceived as
a set of norms of behavior that a person in the position of legislator has internalized,
which (consciously or unconsciously) guides that person's actual behavior." Id.
Johnson and Secret's study was based upon face-to-face interviews with eighteen
members of the United States Congress in 1992, twelve African Americans and six
Hispanics. Id. at 251.
83. Id. at 248.
84. The "purposive" aspect of legislative roles examines how a legislator views
what his or her job is, or should be. The "partisan" aspect of legislative roles refers
to the manner in which a legislator relates to his or her party leadership and
organization. The "pressure group" aspect of legislative roles identifies how a
legislator deals with outside influences, such as lobbyists--"as a friend, neutral, or
foe." Id.
85. See Ashworth & Bueno de Mesquita, supra note 79, at 168.
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representing that constituency may well affect what positions he or
she is likely to take on the issues before" the legislative assembly
more than district constituency allegiance. 86  Representational and
areal role orientations "are normative positions that define obligations
and proper methods for the representative."87 The areal (or "focus")
orientation seeks to identify for whose interests a legislator holds
himself responsible.88  For example, a legislator may see his
constituency as being intra-district, regional, statewide, or a distinct
affinity group (e.g., African Americans or women). The
representational (or "style") role orientation informs how a legislator
goes about exercising his or her perceived role, viz., as a trustee,
delegate, or politico. 89
As a trustee, a legislator may see himself as a steward, exercising
independent judgment based upon his own conscience or
information. 90 This means at times acting in a manner (e.g., voting)
toward legislative matters that transcend constituents' or other9'
pressure groups' needs. As a delegate, a legislator perceives himself
as the unwavering voice of the district constituents, articulating issues
and implementing policy addressing their predominant concerns. 92 As
a politico, a legislator mediates between the two aforementioned roles,
making pragmatic determinations, on an issue by issue basis, to apply
his own judgment or advance constituency preferences. 93
Consequently, as it regards school finance reform, support for or
opposition to a particular measure might, to a degree, be predictable
by a legislator's ideology. It is important to state that a given position
is not necessarily fixed nor gleaned from a legislators' political
ideology. So, as a suburban Republican representative, Jordan's
statement is perhaps predictable and typical-anti-tax, (charitably)
anti-"urban," and pro-accountability, with a strong delegate/district
86. Johnson & Secret, supra note 80, at 249 (emphasis added).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 251.
90. Id.
91. Some may perceive, in some cases, constituents themselves as a pressure
group.
92. Johnson & Secret, supra note 80, at 251.
93. Id.
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constituent focus. Based upon research regarding the trustee-
representative approach, it is nonetheless possible that another
suburban Republican might break from her constituents' preferences,
moving to support a school finance plan which would, arguably, work
against their interests, but towards a larger good. In this sense, her
focus and style yield an outcome that is perhaps counterintuitive to her
party affiliation.
3. Legislators'Race and Impact on "Black Interest" Legislation
How a legislator looks and acts is highly correlated.9 4 It has been
long understood that African-American constituents have needs and
interests distinct from whites.95  As a result, African-American
representatives "differ in their responsiveness to the needs and
interests of these constituents." 96 Research has shown that African-
American representatives demonstrate a constituency affinity in their
representational focus in a manner that tends to reach across districts
on issues of unique importance to African Americans. 97 Moreover, it
has been demonstrated that a legislator's race has a significant
influence on legislative agendas, as well as legislation introduction
and passage. 98  Unfortunately, results of African-American
representatives' legislative outcomes on behalf of their African-
American constituents have not been so successful.
Kathleen A. Bratton and Kerry L. Haynie studied legislators in six
different states99 and legislation sponsored in 1969, 1979, and 1989.00
94. See Kathleen A. Bratton & Kerry L. Haynie, Agenda Setting and
Legislative Success in State Legislatures: The Effects of Gender and Race, 61 J.
POL. 658, 659-60 (1999) ("There are many reasons to expect that descriptive
representation translates into substantive representation, and that African-American
and female representatives would indeed introduce new issues to the legislative
policy agenda.").
95. See id. at 660.
96. David T. Canon, Electoral Systems and the Representation of Minority
Interests in Legislatures, in LEGISLATURES: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON
REPRESENTATIVE ASSEMBLIES 149, 159 (Gerhard Loewenberg et al. eds., 2002).
97. Johnson & Secret, supra note 80, at 257-58.
98. Bratton & Haynie, supra note 94, at 660-61.
99. Id. at 663-64 ("Arkansas, California, Illinois, Maryland, New Jersey, and
North Carolina").
100. Id. at 663.
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Specifically, their study of "women's interest" and "black interest"
bills was designed to test whether African-American and women
legislators, by virtue of their group membership, behaved differently,
advanced each other's agenda, or were less likely than others to
successfully pass bills they sponsored.' 0' Bratton and Haynie defined
"black interest" bills as those "that may decrease racial discrimination
or alleviate the effects of such discrimination, and those that are
intended to improve the socioeconomic status of African-
Americans."'
02
They found race exerted a strong influence on the introduction of
black interest bills, and African-American legislators introduced such
bills more often than other legislators. 10 3 Furthermore, they found the
size of the largest city and the number of African Americans in a
district to be significantly associated with the introduction of black
interest bills. 10 4 In three of the states, African-American legislators
were less likely to get their bills passed than whites.0 5 Finally, they
concluded that "urban legislation"'1 6 was less successful than
others. 10
7
What the Bratton and Haynie findings suggest, inter alia, is that
African-American representatives have to rely more upon coalition-
building with colleagues than their white counterparts in order to
achieve desired outcomes on their public policy goals. In the context
of school finance reform and interest convergence, this means that
African-American representatives must be more accommodating of
the interests of their white and/or suburban counterparts. This, of
101. Id. at 659, 663-65.
102. Id. at 664. Bratton and Haynie defined "women's interest bills" as "those
bills that may decrease gender discrimination or alleviate the effects of such
discrimination, and those that are intended to improve the socioeconomic status of
women" (e.g., equal pay measures, day care services, or health services essential for
women). Id.
103. Id. at 667. In addition, Bratton and Haynie found that "women are more
likely than men to introduce women's interest bills .... [B]lacks introduce more
women's interest measures than do whites, and women introduce more black interest
measures than do men." Id. at 667, 670.
104. Id. at 670.
105. Id.
106. "Urban legislation" was characterized as bills focused on health care,
children, and welfare. Id. at 670.
107. Id. at 672.
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course, is especially true if they are in the racial and/or party
minority.10 8 Consequently, reform solutions will reflect a significant
bias toward the interests of non-African-American and suburban
interests.
C. Suburban v. Urban Constituent Interests-Local Control
Most starkly, the school finance reform debate revives the
urban/suburban chasm.'0 9 The suburban "anti-urban" sentiment arose
out of the desegregation era-a product of racism, decaying cities and
school quality, and/or interdistrict busing attempts. 10 Whites who
perceived African Americans as the primary beneficiaries of the
Brown decisions and integration remedies might now see the school
finance reform efforts with the same raced perception."' Like the
resistance to interdistrict busing,12 suburban resistance to school
finance reform is, in many ways, nothing more than suburbanites
rejecting any sense of personal responsibility to improve the education
conditions of those in the inner-cities. When viewed in this light,
Representative Jordan's statement is hardly surprising.
Explicit in the suburban resistance to school finance reform is the
primacy of local control."' Certain finance reform proposals would
threaten such control. In Ohio, for example, wealthy, suburban
108. In the Ohio General Assembly, of the 132 members, there are presently 17
African Americans, all Democrats. Ohio Legislative Black Caucus, About Us, http:
//www.olbc1967.org/ht/d/CaucusDetails/i/767/aboutus/true/pid/273477 (last visited
Oct. 29, 2006).
109. See CASHrN, supra note 17, at 266; Ryan, supra note 20, at 479; see also
Ryan & Heise, supra note 19, at 2045.
110. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
111. Ryan, supra note 20, at 475.
112. See Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken fl), 433 U.S. 267 (1977); Milliken v.
Bradley (Milliken 1), 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
113. See Ryan & Heise, supra note 19, at 2060-61 (discussing the strong
suburban opposition to recapture plans and spending caps). Ryan and Heise contend
that the politics of school choice must be altered to consider strong suburban
interests, and school choice will only be effective if the ways in which suburban
schools can protect their physical and financial independence can be altered. Id. at
2047. In their view, suburban homeowners are the most important stakeholders in
the school-choice debate, and they have self-interested reasons to oppose most
choice plans. Id. at 2045-46.
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schools could spend more money on their own schools, without regard
to a state-imposed cap or penalty. Finance reform proposals which
sought to cap a district's spending or take monies from wealthier
districts to redistribute to poorer districts were a direct threat to local
control. Thus, the primary interest of local control is critical.
To be sure, the interest in "local control" was used to compel a
rejection of interdistrict busing during desegregation.' 14  Ryan and
Heise remind us of the banners of suburbanites, marching in response
to interdistrict busing fears, that read "PRESERVE OUR
NEIGHBORHOOD SCHOOLS.""' 5 In that sense, this argument in
the context of school finance reform carries a vaguely racial tone.
116
However, school finance reform, unlike desegregation efforts, does
not threaten suburban constituents through fear of integration into
their schools; even with voucher programs and school choice,
suburban school districts have been successful in staving off
meaningful integration.' 17 The most perceived risk is to the suburban
pocketbook. 18
114. Id. at 2056 (remarking that politicians and the courts "acted to protect
'local control' of the schools, which in the context of Milliken and interdistrict
integration meant the physical independence of the suburban neighborhood school").
115. Id. at 2055.
116. In the wake of Brown, suburbanization and suburban residential
discrimination (through redlining and restrictive covenants) were the major culprits
in aiding resistance to integration. See Peter P. Swire, The Persistent Problem of
Lending Discrimination: A Law and Economics Analysis, 73 TEX. L. REV. 787, 794-
802 (1995). Opposition to school desegregation and specifically to busing was often
couched in the rhetoric of preserving neighborhood schools and local control. See
Ryan & Heise, supra note 19, at 2050-5 1. For those who objected to integration on
less-than-principled grounds, "pro-local control" and "pro-neighborhood" arguments
acted as a proxy, or mask, for racial animus. But see James E. Ryan, The Supreme
Court and Public Schools, 86 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1375 n.203 (2000) ("There is a
great deal of emphasis on limiting desegregation decrees in order to preserve or
return to local control of schools. Local control is not really justified in educational
terms, however, but rather as consistent with tradition and with principles of
federalism; the notion, in other words, is that state and local governments, not
federal courts, are the proper authorities to run public schools.").
117. Id.at2058.
118. See id. at 2058-62 (explaining how suburban districts have been able to
remain financially independent). Douglas Reed found in his study that whites and
minorities differed significantly in their support or opposition to financial
equalization efforts. Douglas S. Reed, Court-Ordered School Finance Equalization:
Judicial Activism and Democratic Opposition, in DEVELOPMENTS IN SCHOOL
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D. Anti-Tax and Economic Self-Interest
The most apparent interest at issue in school finance reform is
taxation. The chances are great that a proposed reform will be
rejected if it results in (a) the redistribution of tax revenue to poorer
school districts,1"9 (b) a tax increase to generate additional revenue, 2 '
or (c) a cap on spending for local school districts.'21 Any of these
remedies could result in economic loss to some.12 Wealthier districts
in particular might perceive themselves as the financial losers in
school finance, and thus have a heightened incentive to protect their
economic self-interest by opposing such reform efforts.'23 Thus, we
hear the sentiments of Ohio representatives who decry attempts to
"rob Peter to pay Paul" or use "Robin Hood" methods of school
financing. 124
Furthermore, it can be said that anti-tax and economic self-interest
motivated Ohio voters to reject the Issue 2 sales tax levy. While
FINANCE, 1996, at 91, 102-03, 105 (Nat'l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, U.S. Dep't of
Educ. ed., 1997) (concluding that economic self-interest is the overriding influence
on attitudes toward reform).
119. Ryan & Heise, supra note 19, at 2060 ("They especially dislike the idea
that locally raised revenues might be recaptured and redistributed to the rest of the
state.").
120. See Reed, supra note 118, at 103.
121. Ryan & Heise, supra note 19, at 2060-61.
122. Reed, supra note 118, at 103. Reed examines responses in Texas and
New Jersey to school finance litigation along the interests of economics, anti-
tax/government ideology, and racial geography. Reed observes that "an anti-tax
sentiment model could account for much of the opposition-independent of whether
one's own district gains or loses aid or independent of whether one's own tax bill
goes up or down. This could be particularly true if the sentiment is conjoint with an
overall conservative ideological bent." Id.
123. Id.
124. See, e.g., Scott Stephens, School Funding: Textbook Failure, PLAIN
DEALER (Cleveland), Oct. 17, 2004, at Al (quoting Jim Trakas', R-Independence,
criticism of finance reform as "[t]aking from Peter to pay Paul"). Reform measures
have even be re-characterized as "adequacy" measures when they were formerly
called "equalization" measures-a concession to suburban constituents who felt
reform suggested wealth redistribution. Ryan & Heise, supra note 19, at 2062
("Adequacy arguments are . . . 'less threatening' than equality arguments because
they do not interfere with local control over resources or the ability of wealthy
districts to retain a superior position.").
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legislation that might seek tax increases is unpopular across all
ideological and racial spectrums, 125 its unpopularity is intensified for
some if tax increases are used in support of government obligations to
the poor, or as a wealth distribution mechanism.' 
26
E. Separation of Powers
Even where there may be agreement on the need for school
funding remedies, where the directive to act comes from also impacts
the chances of success. As Ryan's research demonstrated, court-
"imposed" directives-particularly those initiated by minority school
districts-face fierce opposition. 127 Judges who have ruled in favor of
plaintiffs in school-funding litigation have been labeled "activists" '1 28
and worse. 129 To those in like mind with Representative Wise, 130
125. See Reed, supra note 118, at 103 (positing, through analysis of survey
results, that "no" votes on ballot proposition which would raise taxes may be better
explained by class than race); Author's Poll 2001-2002, supra note 48, at 5 (finding
the percentage of opposition to local tax levy proposal was roughly the same across
racial lines).
126. Ryan & Heise, supra note 19, at 2061.
127. Ryan, supra note 20, at 455-63.
128. See, e.g., Bush Leads Poll as Voters Stay Mostly Faithful to Their Party,
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Apr. 19, 2000, at 2D (quoting Ohio Attorney General Betty
Montgomery, "We've got a very activist court which in many cases is making law
from the bench."); Barbara Hollingsworth, Justices United in Ruling: Washburn
Professor Calls 'Activist'Label Unfair, TOPEKA CAPITAL-JOURNAL, June 7, 2005, at
Al (quoting Kansas Senator Tim Huelskamp, R-Fowler, "This is not a case of
judicial activism. This is a case of judges out of control."); Judicial Lawmaking:
High Court Wreaks Havoc on Ohio Schools, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Mar. 25, 1997,
at 14A ("Today's court is marked by judicial activists who do not feel constrained
by the explicit words of the Ohio Constitution . . . ."); Richard Nadler, Forgetting
Federalism, NAT'L REv., June 28, 2005 ("No [litigation] trend better illustrates
judicial activism than the steady stream of state school-finance decisions .... ").
129. In Ohio, Judge Resnick, the author of the majority opinion in DeRolph II,
endured an unprecedented campaign against her re-election. The Ohio Chamber of
Commerce, in conjunction with the United States Chamber of Commerce, spent $3
million in the campaign to defeat her. Alan Johnson, O'Donnell May Be Taft's
Pick: Likely Choice For Supreme Court Seat Lost to Resnick in Bruising 2000 Race,
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, May 9, 2003, at IF. As another example, shortly after the
Kansas Supreme Court ruled that the legislature had to reconvene to resolve
outstanding school finance issues, Senator Kay O'Connor, R-Olathe, said that "the
'goofy court' was 'out of line' and needed to be 'put in its place."' Scott Rothschild,
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such court rulings abrogate of the separation of powers and usurp
legislative authority.
Moreover, as the Ohio KnowledgeWorks Foundation survey
reveals, African Americans and whites have a markedly different view
of the role of courts on the subject of school finance reform.' 3' This is
not without historical precedent either, as African Americans have
often had only the courts to ensure some measure of justice in the
realm of public policy.'32 That said, the hue and cry that came in the
wake of several state court decisions on school finance reform is
disturbingly familiar, particularly if one recalls the outrage over the
Supreme Court's "abuse of power" in deciding Brown. 
133
Tensions Run High as Conservatives Try To Defeat Bill Funding Schools,
LAWRENCE JOURNAL-WORLD, June 23, 2005, http://www2.ljworld.com/news/2005/
jun/23/schools/. Representative Lance Kinzer, R-Olathe, introduced a constitutional
amendment which would remove school finance appropriation issues from the
court's jurisdiction. Scott Rothschild, Legislators Gear Up for Historic Special
Session, LAWRENCE JOURNAL-WORLD, June 21, 2005, http://www2.ljworld.com/
news/2005/jun/2 1/legislatorsgearup/. An alternative measure would have
restructured the manner in which judges were appointed to the courts, making them
subject to Senate confirmation. Carl Manning, Legislators Angered by High Court
Decisions: Death Penalty, School Finance Spark Backlash in Statehouse,
LAWRENCE JOURNAL-WORLD, Mar. 27, 2005, http://www2.ljworld.com/news/
2005/mar/27/legislators angered by/. These examples of legislator and voter
responses to judges deciding school finance cases in Ohio and Kansas also suggest
that a ripe area for further research would be an examination of the influence of
court-directed school finance reform on judicial candidates in states in which judges
are elected, and on legislators' responses to such directives through campaigns or
retributive legislation proposals.
130. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
131. See supra notes 48-57 and accompanying text.
132. On the issue of civil rights, one need only look to the political and
legislative barriers placed before African Americans since the Emancipation
Proclamation. See OGLETREE, supra note 14, at 97-122. As a result, the NAACP's
strategy against Jim Crow laws and segregation was an intentional, deliberate battle
waged in the courts. See id. at 113-23. Cases such as Pearson v. Murray, Missouri
ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, Sipuel v. Oklahoma, Sweatt v. Painter, and McLaurin v.
Oklahoma successfully chipped away at Jim Crow laws, and eventually provided the
foundation for the Brown v. Board of Education decision. Id. at 120-22.
133. One response to the Brown decisions, the infamous Southern Manifesto-
sponsored by Strom Thurmond of South Carolina, Harry Byrd of Virginia, and
Richard Russell of Georgia (and signed by ninety-three others)-stated in part:
"[T]he school cases [are] a clear abuse of judicial power .... With the gravest
concern for the explosive and dangerous condition created by this decision and
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F. Accountability
"Accountability" demands have become an explicit component of
virtually all modem public school finance reform legislation. 34 It is a
term invoked by politicians, pundits, and policymakers alike.' 35
Accountability standards are based upon factors such as student test
inflamed by outside meddlers ... [w]e commend the motives of those States which
have declared the intention to resist forced integration by any lawful means." THE
SOUTHERN MANIFESTO (1956), http://www.strom.clemson.edu/strom/manifesto.
html. Shortly after the Brown I ruling, Governor Orville Faubus blithely declared
that Arkansas was "not bound by ... Brown"; only federal troops would compel, if
not persuade, him otherwise. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 4, 12 (1958). But
see id. at 18-19 (holding that a state governor has no power to nullify a federal court
order). In Virginia, Governor Thomas Stanley appointed the Gray Commission to
"study" methods by which to keep the schools separate. Edward H. Peeples, Jr.,
Prince Edward County: The Story Without an End (July 1963) (unpublished
manuscript, available at http://www.library.vcu.edu/jbc/speccoll/pec03a.html). The
Texas legislature passed a law stating that no child could be compelled to attend a
racially mixed school. The History of Jim Crow, http://jimcrowhistory.org/
geography/geography.htm (follow the State of Texas image hyperlink) (last visited
Oct. 31, 2006). The Delaware legislature passed a comparable law preventing a
predominantly African-American school district from consolidating with other
districts. Leland B. Ware, Educational Equity and Brown v. Board of Education:
Fifty Years of School Desegregation in Delaware, 47 How. L.J. 299, 315 (2004).
134. See NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., OVERVIEW
AND INVENTORY OF STATE EDUCATION REFORMS: 1990 To 2000, at 2, 13-18
(tracking states' factors and measures on student and teacher performance).
135. Rachel F. Moran, Sorting and Reforming: High-Stakes Testing in the
Public Schools, 34 AKRON L. REV. 107, 109-112 (2000). Moran discusses the
movement toward accountability standards in public education and assessment,
"particularly in urban schools." Id. at 109. For an example of legislation invoking
accountability standards, see No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, 20 U.S.C.A. § 6301
(West 2003). Lieutenant Governor David Dewhurst of Texas has discussed the need
to craft a school finance bill that "will improve our schools, such as teacher pay
raises, incentives and increased accountability and performance." Terrence Stutz,
Senate To Add School Fixes: Dewhurst Questions If House's Property Tax Cut Is
Doable, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, April 26, 2006, at IA. Upon the New York
Senate's passage of education reforms, Senator Steve Saland noted the "scandalous
financial occurrences in some school districts in New York State recently," saying
that the new bills "would put more appropriate checks in place to account for the use
of taxpayer dollars. Accountability in our schools must be a priority." Press
Release, N.Y. State Senate Republican Majority, Senate Passes School
Accountability Legislation (June 21, 2005), available at http://www.
senate. state.ny.us/pressreleases.nsf/publicbruno?openform.
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performance, dropout rates, attendance, resource expenditures, and
graduation rates.' 36 Data is compiled, examined, and utilized to "hold
educators and others responsible" for performance outcomes. 3 7 Since
finance reform litigation in many states has mandated reallocation of
public monies, there is an interest, above all, that those monies be
spent responsibly. This interest is also inferred in Representative
Jordan's statement. 138
One could argue that demands for accountability are also vestiges
of the desegregation experience. As monies flowed into public
schools as a result of integration orders, intense dissatisfaction was
expressed about waste, mismanagement, and fraud. 139 Most
importantly, for some, the monies seemed to do nothing to improve
the ultimate goal of desegregation: better achievement outcomes for
African Americans. 140 As we have seen outcome improvement over
time, there are still vast disparities between African-American student
outcomes and others. With school finance reform, provisions for
fiscal management, teacher training, curriculum reform, and student
performance measurements will be imperative for any legislation to
obtain consensus.
136. NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, supra note 134, at 13.
137. Id.
138. Leonard, supra note 1.
139. Melissa C. Carr & Susan H. Fuhrman, The Politics of School Finance in
the 1990s, in EQUITY AND ADEQUACY IN EDUCATION FINANCE: ISSUES AND
PERSPECTIVES 136, 152 (Helen F. Ladd et al. eds., 1999).
140. CASHIN, supra note 17, at 213; Bell, supra note 8, at 530-31; see also
Janet Ward Schofield & Leslie R.M. Hausmann, The Conundrum of School
Desegregation: Positive Student Outcomes and Waning Support, 66 U. PITT. L. REV.
83, 99 (2004) ("[A]lthough academic gains have been made for African-American
students as a result of desegregation, there continues to be a marked achievement
gap between African-American and White students."). As Professor David Armor
of George Mason University observed, "Pretty much, the outcomes were
negative .... Busing caused substantial white flight, making racial isolation worse.
We've never been able to document achievement increases (for minority students)."
Kenneth Jost, Debating Desegregation, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 17, 1996, at
ID.
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SUMMARY
It has been said that "school finance court decisions will lead to
legislative reform only when those decisions coincide with an existing
political consensus in favor of reform." 14 1  In other words, the
interests of policymakers must converge in order to implement an
effective solution to public school funding imperatives. Examining
the Ohio experience, the interests are clear. Successful legislative
solutions will:
(1) Preserve local control and decision making.
(2) Not entail wealth redistribution by:
(a) Limiting amounts given to wealthier districts while
giving more to poorer districts,
(b) Constraining the ability of local districts to spend as
much as they want to fund their local education, or
(c) Seeking to capture or recapture local revenue to fund
other school districts.
(3) Provide a mechanism for low-wealth districts to generate
needed funds without decreasing monies to, or reallocating
monies from, wealthier districts.
(4) Provide for accountability measurements on fiscal
responsibility, teacher performance, and student
performance. 1 42
(5) Emphasize school reform's benefits to poor, not just urban
poor, and to rural and middle class.
(6) Require urban/rural coalitions of state legislators, who
share common interests regarding education reform. 143
141. Ryan, supra note 20, at 475.
142. See David H. Monk & Neil D. Theobald, A Conceptual Framework for
Examining School Finance Reform Options for the State of Ohio, 27 J. EDUC. FIN.
501, 501-02 (2001) (evaluating the results of forty interviews involving fifty-eight
stakeholders in the school finance debate); Ryan & Heise, supra note 19, at 2059-63.
143. Yohance C. Edwards & Jennifer Ahem, Note, Unequal Treatment in State
Supreme Courts: Minority and City Schools in Education Finance Reform
Litigation, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 326, 354-60 (2004) (noting the success and common
interests in education finance reform between urban and rural constituents). But see
Ryan, supra note 20, at 476 ("It is .. . difficult to imagine a strong political
consensus among state legislators to redistribute or raise resources for
predominantly minority districts.").
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These solutions, espoused by reform advocates, glaringly ignore
the interests that are most salient to African Americans and their
representatives. Solutions to school finance reform must also
specifically assure that disadvantaged African-American students (and
other minorities) benefit from quality facilities, teachers, and
resources in ways tailored to their needs, and in a manner that does not
place disproportionate burdens on those with the least.
CONCLUSION
The thesis that the interest convergence paradigm exists in
legislative decision making, at first blush, may seem like Politics 101
and thus not worthy of much discussion. Any school finance reform
at the legislative level will require, and certainly represent, some
expression of shared ideas and majority consensus. However, the
reality is much more complex. By their very nature, legislative
institutions, political ideology, legislative party control,
majority/minority ratios, and the inherent (and under-examined)
complexities of representational focus and style (and other role
aspects) will impact school finance reform inputs and outcomes.
Consequently, school finance reform solutions-if and when they
come-must represent some form of interest convergence.
In Ohio, legislators have attempted to resolve school finance
dilemmas through "majority appeasement," that is, in a manner that
not only is the least harmful to their constituents, but in a manner that
will also benefit their constituents. Though overreaching and
disingenuous, one could view that goal as race-neutral. However,
suburban and conservative resistance to school finance reform will
always carry a discomfiting subtext so long as political leaders
continue to tether the present debate to our nation's chaotic and bitter
desegregation history. Even race-neutral terms, such as "anti-
taxation," "Robin Hood" financing, "judicial activism, .... local
control," and "accountability," carry the scent of racial animus when
used irresponsibly or in demagoguery.
In addition, the political, geographic, and racial composition of
state legislatures have rendered those most compelled to advocate for
African-American student interests marginalized in policy outcomes,
particularly in Ohio. There is no interest convergence if the only
interests being promoted are those of the majority. True interest
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convergence means that the majority must also account for African-
American interests as well. The result should be that public education
is reformed to meet the specific needs of and challenges to African-
American students, and racing reform solutions-whether directly or
by rhetorical proxy-are stopped.
The h'aint-racism-is still in the house. Unlike in the past,
however, it has become more difficult to smoke out. While there are
certainly other important dynamics at play, we must continue to
exorcise the h'aint in order to achieve meaningful solutions to the
school finance reform debate.
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